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COMPETITIVE HARM FROM VERTICAL MERGERS
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
The long-needed revision of the antitrust agencies’ Vertical
Merger Guidelines (VMGs) is an important achievement.1 This essay
examines them in light of the standards articulated in §7 of the Clayton
Act.
As enacted in 1914, §7 of the Clayton Act did not apply to
vertical mergers. The statute referred to mergers that lessened
competition “between” the merging firms.2 That is the anticipated
competitive threat from a horizontal merger, as well as most potential
competition mergers.3 The lessening of competition that occurs in a
vertical merger is generally not between the merging firms, however,
but between the post-merger firm and other firms who were not parties
to the merger. In the simple vertical merger case, there was no
competition between the merging firms prior to the merger. A few
cases, such as Columbia Steel and Brown Shoe, were simultaneously
vertical and horizontal because the parties operated in both the
upstream and downstream markets.4 An important purpose of the 1950
Clayton Act amendments was to add vertical mergers to the practices
that fell within the statute.

*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pa. Carey Law School and
the Wharton School.
1
United States Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Vertical
Merger Guidelines (VMG) (June 30, 2020), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justicefederal-trade-commission-vertical-mergerguidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf.
2
Original §7 applied to acquisitions “… where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition….”
3

E.g. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
4

1
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A principal motivator of the 1950 amendments was the
Supreme Court’s 1948 Columbia Steel decision. That decision had
refused to condemn a vertical asset acquisition under the Sherman Act,
largely because of ambiguities about market definition and market
shares that the Court found to be too small.5 The purpose of the 1950
§7 Amendments was threefold. First, it was drafted to expand the
reach of the statute to vertical mergers. Second, the statute was
amended so as to include both stock and asset acquisitions. Third, the
new provision applied the Clayton Act’s broader “may substantially
lessen competition” standard to both vertical mergers and mergers by
asset acquisition.6 The amendments were presumably intended to
establish that the market share standards applied in the Columbia Steel
case were too narrow.
Prior to the amendments, the Supreme Court had also
addressed the difference between the Sherman and Clayton Act
standards of legality in another vertical case, although one that
involved a contract practice rather than a merger. In Standard Stations
(1949) the Court condemned exclusive dealing under §3 of the Clayton
Act, which uses the same “may … substantially lessen competition”
language. The Court observed that the statute was “directed to
prohibiting specific practices even though not covered by the broad
terms of the Sherman Act….”7 The Court also declined to hold that
the Sherman Act would condemn the restraint.8 So the clear message
was that the Clayton Act’s injury language reached more broadly than
the Sherman Act language in vertical cases.
These important statutory differences notwithstanding, the
sharp expansion in merger policy that occurred under the 1950
Amendments was actually driven less by technical changes in the
language of the revised statute than by the legislative history. That
became clear in the Brown Shoe decision, which examined the
legislative history at some length. Brown Shoe was both horizontal
and vertical. Further, it was a stock acquisition, so the horizontal
portion of the merger was already covered by the original Clayton Act.
5

Ibid.
See Id., 334 U.S. at 507, n. 7 (action was not brought under Clayton Act
because it was an asset rather than a stock acquisition).
7
Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See Id. at 297, 300-301.
8
Id. at 314.
6
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Relying on Reports from both the House and the Senate, however,
Brown Shoe concluded that the amendments changed the standard of
legality even under the “may substantially lessen competition”
standard. The revised statute was “intended to reach incipient
monopolies and trade restraints outside the Sherman Act.”9 The Court
concluded that the “dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy.”10
The Court also noted a 1947 FTC study citing “the danger to
the American economy in unchecked corporate expansions through
mergers.” In addition, Brown Shoe observed, the legislative history
reflected Congress’ belief in the “desirability of retaining ‘local
control’ over industry and the protection of small businesses,“11 as well
as “other values” that a “trend toward concentration” threatened.12
Those other values were described as something other than
“accelerated concentration of economic power on economic
grounds.”13 Finally, the Court observed that repeated acquisitions in
an industry could have a “cumulative effect,” and that “control of the
market * * * may be achieved not in a single acquisition but as the
result of a series of acquisitions.”14
One prominent antitrust economist from the period hailed that
Report as representing the FTC’s increased use of economics in
merger cases.15 Then Harvard Law Professor Derek Bok gave the
9

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 318 n. 32, citing H.R.Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (‘Acquisitions of stock or assets have a cumulative effect,); S.Rep.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4—5, U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, 1950,
p. 4296 (‘The intent here * * * is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would
justify a Sherman Act proceeding.’).
10
Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-316 (1962).
11
Brown Shoe. supra, discussing FTC, The Present Trend of Corporate
Mergers and Acquisitions (1947), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 515 at 300317 (1950).
12
Brown Shoe, Ibid.
13
Id. at 316.
14
Id. at 317-318 & n. 32.
15
See Jesse W. Markham, The Federal Trade Commission’s Use of
Economics, 64 COL. L. REV. 405, 412-413 (1964). Markham was an
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statute more qualified praise, but he criticized the legislative history
for “the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects of
concentration on prices, innovation, distribution, and efficiency.”16 To
be sure, he observed, Congress expressed a concern about the “need
for preserving competition.” However, “competition appeared to
possess a strong socio-political connotation which centered on the
virtues of the small entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in
economic literature.”17
With Brown Shoe the Supreme Court embarked on a
substantial expansion of merger law, often on rationales that did more
harm than good to competition. Among these rationales were
exaggerated theories of harm as well as the perverse idea that mergers
should be condemned because of efficiencies that served to harm
rivals.
It is important not to cast too much of the blame for this on the
Supreme Court, however. First, the legislative history supported it.
Second, all of the Supreme Court’s expansive decisions during this
period were brought by either the Antitrust Division or the Federal
Trade Commission.18 The Court merely did what the enforcement
agencies requested, condemning mergers on small markets shares that
would never be challenged today, and on rationales, including the
creation of efficiencies that harmed competing business or higher
concentration for its own sake.19 The Supreme Court was no more to
blame than Congress and the enforcement agencies. Indeed, in cases
of statutory interpretation it had a duty to follow the statute, not to
make its own economic policy.

economics professor at both Princeton and Harvard Business School, as
well as chief economists for the FTC.
16
Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960). Bok later became President of
Harvard University.
17
Id. at 236-237. For further analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok
and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 J. L. REFORM 515 (1988).
18
E.g., Brown Shoe, supra; United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
19
E.g., In re Foremost Dairies, Inc. 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962), modified,
67 F.T.C. 282 (1965) (condemning a merger because its efficiencies would
give the firm a “decisive advantage” over competitors).
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Subsequently, both Harvard and Chicago School thinking
pushed back at the aggressive attitudes about industrial concentration,
as well as the idea that merger-induced efficiency was an affirmative
harm.20 But the Chicago School went much further. Particularly in
the writings of Robert Bork, vertical practices including mergers came
to be viewed as virtually always harmless.21 These positions were
heavily reflected in the 1984 Merger Guidelines, which were written
during the high point of Chicago School influence on government
policy and were the most recent previous Guidelines to address the
topic of vertical mergers prior to the 2020 Guidelines.22
The economic writing since the 1980s has largely repudiated
both the Brown Shoe view and the Bork view of vertical mergers.
Today vertical mergers are regarded with less suspicion overall than
horizontal mergers. Nevertheless, they still pose competitive threats
in some cases, with harm measured by realistic threats of reduced
output, higher prices, or harms to innovation – precisely the things that
Derek Bok had mentioned. The 2020 VMGs are a first public attempt
to capture these concerns in a way capable of being implemented in
enforcement policy. They need not be the final word. Just as the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, they are very likely destined to go
through periodic revisions as enforcers acquire greater experience.
Proof Requirements
When the government is suing as enforcer it need not quantify
the harm to competition other than showing that it “may be …
substantial.”23 One qualification is that if a factually supported
efficiency defense is established (something that the statute itself does
not acknowledge), then the person with the burden of showing mergerspecific efficiencies must show that these would be sufficient to
prevent prices from rising above premerger levels. Proof of that would
require quantification at least in cases where substantial mergerspecific efficiencies have been shown and the balance between price
20

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF, CHS. 9 & 10 (1978); 4 & 5 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 9 (1980).
21
Bork, id. at Chs. 11, 14-15.
22
Department of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines §4.2, available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1984-merger-guidelines.
23
15 U.S.C. §18.
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increase effects and efficiency effects is close enough to require
measurement.
Private plaintiffs can also challenge vertical mergers, and
presumably under the same substantive standards. If they are seeking
treble damages, however, they must quantify their injury sufficiently
to support a reasonable estimate of damages.24 If they are seeking only
an injunction they must show “threatened loss or damage,”25 which
does not require quantification. For purposes of damages, the nature
of the proof depends on the identity of the plaintiff. For example, a
customer complaining that a merger produced an overcharge would
have to be able to quantify a post-merger price increase and show
causation.26 By contrast, an excluded rival may claim lost profits or
sales as damages.27
The 2020 VMG must be regarded as a very considerable
improvement over any Agency or judicial policy statement in the past.
They are certainly not the final word and one anticipates that they will
be revised from time to time, just as the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
have been. The balance of this paper examines some of the most
important features of the Guidelines’ approach to vertical mergers.
The VMG’s Theories of Harm
Foreclosure and Raising Rivals’ Costs (RRC)
Historically the economics of vertical relationships spoke of
vertically related “markets,” usually described as an upstream market
and a downstream market. For example, in a case such as Brown Shoe,
manufacturing of leather shoes was the upstream market and retailing
was the downstream market. By contrast, the VMG speak of a
“relevant market” as the market where a threat to competition is to be
investigated. In addition are one or more “related products,” which
can be either vertically related to the relevant market or else
complementary.28 This usage is part of a progression in merger
24

See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR, AND
CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶340 (5th ed. 2021).
25
15 U.S.C. §26.
26
2A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE, supra note __, ¶395.
27
Id., ¶397.
28
VMG, supra note __, §3.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683386

2020

Vertical Mergers

7

analysis away from traditional market definition/market share
assessment and toward examination of bargaining relationships. Here,
as in the case of “unilateral effects” horizontal mergers, traditional
market definitions are not always necessary to the analysis.29
On the other hand, older language in the case law seems to
require a market definition.30 Problematically, relatively recent
language in the 2018 AmEx decision also requires a market definition
in cases involving “vertical restraints.”31 The Court in that case was
not referencing mergers and was speaking of §1 of the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, the theories of harm in vertical restraints cases are
analogous to those in most merger cases. Enforcers and economists
evaluating vertical mergers may have to confront the scope of the
Supreme Court’s statement. One troublesome implication of the AmEx
Court’s language is that it turns into a question of law something that
has always been and should be treated as a question of fact.32
The VMGs acknowledge several ways that a vertical merger
might harm competition by raising rivals’ costs (RRC), which means
“increasing the price or lowering the quality” of the related product.
This is a product that the rivals buy from or sell to the now merged
firm. In the Guidelines the RRC theory and foreclosure are grouped
together, in a more general discussion of unilateral effects.33 Many of
the RRC theories of harm depend on assumptions about bargaining
behavior and outcomes.34

29

See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶913-914 (4th ed. 2017).
30
See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1963) (interpreting
Clayton Act’s “section of the country” and “line of commerce” language as
requiring, respectively, a geographic market and a product market); and see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §3.1 (6th ed. 2020).
31
Ohio v. American Express co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).
32
On the Supreme Court’s tendency to turn factual questions of economics
into questions of law, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in
Antitrust Economics, __ Boston Univ. L. Rev. __ (2021), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3508832.
33
VMG, supra note __, §4.a.
34
The theory of RRC dates back to seminal work done in the 1980s. See
Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM.
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As historically developed in the courts, “foreclosure” was very
largely a binary concept. Practices such as exclusive dealing or tying
foreclosed when they made it contractually impossible for a rival of
the contracting party to do business in a market, and thus excluded it.
For example, a truck manufacturer might acquire a producer of wheels
and brakes and then refuse to sell these essential inputs to rival truck
makers.35
Raising rivals’ costs (RRC) is, in essence, a “metered”
alternative to foreclosure. Incrementally raising a rivals’ costs
eventually hits a point where the rival can no longer compete, and then
we have foreclosure. Short of that, however, raising its costs can still
produce competitive harm by creating an umbrella that will permit the
defendant to raise its own prices. The theory of RRC is an inescapable
conclusion from marginalist economics, in which virtually everything
is graduated, and it is hard to see why some people doubted it.36 The
theory was implicitly recognized in the antitrust case law at least as far
back as American Can, where the defendant bought up exclusive rights
on all the best can making technology in order to relegate competitors
to inferior manufacturing methods.37 The theory of RRC rests on the
simple observation that a practice that makes it more costly for a
competitor to do business can harm competition even though the firm
is not forced out of the market.38 This is particularly true of practices
that can force a price increase in a rival’s inputs. The harm is
measured, not by the competitor’s demise, but rather by the increase
in equilibrium prices.
RRC and Bargaining Theory
A focal point of vertical merger analysis under the VMG is
mergers that change the bargaining position of the post-merger firm,
ECON. REV. 267 (1983); and Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to achieve Power Over
Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
35
Fruehauf corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
36
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 196 (2d ed. 2001) (RRC
is “not a happy formula”). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the
Sherman Act, 72 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 147, 159 (2005).
37
United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D.Md. 1916), app. dism’d,
256 U.S. 706 (1921).
38
Salop & Scheffman, supra note __.
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resulting in higher prices. Although the theory derived from Cournot’s
writings in the nineteenth century the modern theory depends heavily
on work that John Nash and others did in the 1950s and after.39
Bargaining theory also drives a great deal of “unilateral effects”
analysis in horizontal merger cases,40 and has had a more limited role
in patent damages determinations.41
Despite its long pedigree, the bargaining economics of vertical
mergers can become quite complex. The result can be dueling experts’
reports that are beyond the ability of most judges to understand. This
fact has produced judicial resistance and may have affected the
outcome in the AT&T/Time Warner case.42 In such cases the court
should consider appointing a neutral expert to evaluate the conflicting
claims. While the use of third-party experts is cumbersome and costly,
much is at stake in a large vertical merger case, and the parties should
have sufficient resources to cover it. Judge Posner approved such an
approach in a case that contemplated a jury trial,43 and it is even more
readily adaptable to a bench trial in a civil merger challenge.
Nash bargaining theory considers how a change in two
bargainers’ reservation prices might affect the equilibrium result of
their bargain. For example, Jack wants to purchase a refrigerator from
39

John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); Ariel
Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA
97 (1982). For general discussions, see MARTIN OSBORNE AND ARIEL
RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS (1990); ABHINAY MUTHOO,
BARGAINING THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS (1999).
40

See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive
Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
COMPETITION LAW (Paolo Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press 2005); Steven W.
Salant, Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, Losses from Horizontal
Merger: the Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, 98 Q.J. ECON. 185 (1983).
41
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
42
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C.Cir. 2019). See
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, §9.5.
43
See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation (HFCS), 295
F.3d 651, 665 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1188 (2003) (creating a
procedure for selecting a neutral expert in a situation involving a dispute
between warring regression models).
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Jane. The most Jack is willing to pay is $100 and the least Jane is
willing to accept is $60. That leaves $40 worth of surplus, or
bargaining room, so the parties should be able to reach a deal. But
what will the price be? In a competitive market it would be the sellers’
marginal cost, so most of the surplus would go to Jack. By contrast, if
Jane is a monopolist and the buy side is competitive, then most of the
surplus would go to Jane. In a bilateral monopoly, where neither party
sees good alternatives the parties will make a deal but under the classic
theory the price will be indeterminate.44
One important contribution of John Nash and subsequent game
theorists such as Ariel Rubinstein was to show that under a broad and
plausible range of assumptions the equilibrium price would tend
toward an even split of the surplus. This result has been confirmed in
many theoretical and empirical models.45 How close to even can
depend on several factors, including each party’s risk aversion,
transaction costs and how evenly they are balanced, identity of the
first mover, quality of information about own and others’ preferences,
the bargaining power or “toughness” of the parties, and time horizons.
In general, the models as well as the experiments that begin with equal
risk aversion, bargaining power, and information quality arrive at
equilibria at or very close to a 50-50 split.46
To the extent there is an imbalance the results may differ. For
example, a more risk averse bargainer will get less of the surplus.
Bargainers with more bargaining power will get more. This could
have important implications for merger policy. To the extent that a
vertical merger increases the post-merger firm’s bargaining power the
bargaining outcome is more likely to be greater than a 50% share of
the surplus. That could also be the case if the seller is a risk neutral
firm and the buyer is a risk averse customer. The seller would get more
than half of the surplus. A priori, there is no reason for thinking that
the post-merger firm would get less than half of the surplus.
44

See Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, and Richard E. Romano, A
Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989).
45
Po-Hsuan Lin, et al, General Economic Principles of Bargaining and
Trade: Evidence from 2000 Classroom Experiments, NATURE (HUMAN
BEHAVIOR) (Aug. 2020), available at
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0916-8#citeas.
46
Ibid.
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The role of transaction costs is interesting. In the standard
Coasean literature high transaction costs generally interfere with the
market’s ability to reach joint maximizing equilibria.47 In bilateral
monopoly situations, however, positive transaction costs can actually
induce an equilibrium by making bargaining rounds costly.48 The
story is similar to the bargaining that occurs in the Coase Theorem
literature, where two people are in conflict over a particular legal
entitlement, such as a physician’s annoyance at a neighboring
confectioner’s noisy mortar and pestle.49 Coase concluded that an
efficient bargain would result in an exchange any time the buyer’s
reservation price was higher than the seller’s. For example, if the
physician valued the right to be free from the noise at $500, while the
confectioner valued continued operation at $400, the two would
conclude an agreement under which the confectioner would shut
down. The term “shut down” here actually describes a range of
possibilities that may fall short of complete shut down, such as
reducing activity levels to less harmful levels, or installing devices that
reduce or eliminate the harm. If the confectioner had a legal right to
operate, the physician would have to pay for this shut down. The
amount would be indeterminate, but somewhere between $400 and
$500.
On the question of how the surplus would be divided, Coase
himself intuited but never proved that the two parties would divide the
surplus evenly. He drew this intuition in response to a literature that
emerged in the 1980s about the failure of a core, or bargaining
equilibrium, under the Coase theorem. His response was that as soon
as you account for transaction costs bargaining must eventually end.
Rational maximizers will realize that there is more to be had from
47

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
48
On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and
Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 970 (1990); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative
Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519, 524-526 (2002).
49
Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852, (1883), 32 Reports of Cases
Decided by the English Courts 837. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 (1960).
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reaching a deal than endless bargaining. Further, the most likely
outcome is an even split.50
If an equal division of the surplus is a likely outcome, a change
in reservation prices will affect the equilibrium bargain in the same
direction and by half the amount of the change. For example, in the
refrigerator example Jack was willing to pay $100 and Jane was
willing to accept $60, so an even split price would be $80. What if
Jane’s options change? Perhaps as a result of some change in
circumstances she can make the sale elsewhere at a price of $70. As a
result, her opportunity costs and her reservation price to Jack is at least
$70 as well. Now the Nash equilibrium will split the difference
between $70 and $100, or $85.
A vertical merger will raise a seller’s reservation price when it
makes alternative transactions more attractive. Typically, the change
results from a change in opportunity costs that results from the
availability of some new alternative. To hypothesize some facts from
the AT&T/Time-Warner case, prior to the merger TW’s assets
consisted of an enormous amount of highly desirable video content
subject to high fixed costs, very low short-run marginal costs, and nonrivalrous output. The last attribute means simply that a single digital
program, such as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, can be
licensed an infinite number of times. In the absence of any restraints
on pricing, and with the power to price discriminate, TW’s maximizing
strategy would be to license every taker willing to pay more than
marginal cost. It would have no incentive to block any customer
because that would simply mean less revenue.
After the merger with AT&T, however, TW faces a different
calculus. AT&T owns DirecTV, whose satellite broadcasting
competes with consumer cable, Dish Network, and other TV
programming nationwide. So now it is not only a producer of video
50

RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 162 (1988). See
also Ronald H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment,
24 J.L. & ECON. 183, 184 (1981) (responding to critique that under Coase
theorem there would be no equilibrium by illustrating repeated rounds of
bargaining converging on even division of the surplus). See Varouj A.
Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24
J.L. & Econ. 175 (1981). For good discussion, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).
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content, it is also a consumer in behalf of its subscription customers.
This may give it an incentive to either black out content or charge
higher prices to rival program retailers. For example, a price increase
from $2 to $3 may not have been profit maximizing prior to the merger.
However, after the merger AT&T/TW might be able to recapture some
of the lost revenue if some customers respond to the price increase by
switching away from a competing cable company to DirecTV.
The effect will be to raise AT&T/TW’s reservation price to
outside distributors of programming and, accordingly, the equilibrium
sale price will increase. In sum, a price increase that was not profitable
prior to the merger is profitable after, once we consider recaptured
income that comes from people who switch to DirecTV.
This analysis of revenue recapture is not fundamentally
different from what occurs in unilateral effects merger cases. Prior to
the merger a particular price increase produces so many lost sales that
it is unprofitable. To the extent some of these sales go to the acquired
firm, however, the post-merger firm recaptures that revenue and the
price increase becomes profitable. It is also captured for vertical
merger analysis by the development of relatively easy-to-use tools
such as the Vertical Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index, or vGUPPI,
which measures changes in incentives that serve to increase the postmerger firm’s profit-maximizing price.51
Predicting the size of the price increase requires an inquiry into
how the acquisition would change the sales calculus of AT&T after the
TW content is folded into the firm. This would require examining the
payoffs and costs, including margins and volume of lost and recaptured
sales.
Merger law does not require the government as enforcer to
quantify the size of the price increase with any precision. Since the
government is seeking only an injunction, it simply needs to show the
existence of harm under a “where the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition” standard. As a result, showing sufficient harm to
enjoin a merger on this basis need not require an assumption that the
51

Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J.
1962 (2018); Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, VGuppi: Scoring Unilateral
Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013).
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parties will split the surplus in half, but only that the equilibrium price
will rise as the post-merger firm’s reservation price increases.
Estimating the size of the price increase requires a deeper dig.
That would be necessary, for example, if the action had been brought
by a private plaintiff purchaser seeking damages. It would have to
quantify the overcharge. However, an action for damages would
necessarily be post-acquisition, because no damages would ordinarily
result until after the merger occurred. In that case there could be
alternative mechanisms for estimating damages, such as before-andafter or perhaps yardstick methods.52 If the private plaintiff is seeking
to enjoin a contemplated but not consummated merger the statutory
standard is “threatened loss or damage,” and no quantification is
necessary.53
One analogue that has produced some case law is the
computation of patent damages, where there has been significant
judicial resistance to the use of Nash bargaining models. The Patent
Act prescribes a market-mimicking approach to assessing damages,
that must be “in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”54 One
historical starting point was the “25% rule,” which simply assumed
that 25% of an infringer’s profits from the infringement would be paid
out as a royalty, but in Uniloc the Federal Circuit rejected that
approach as having no foundation.55
The Nash bargaining approach provides an alternative by
assuming as bargaining parameters that the royalty be not less than
zero and not more than the defendant’s entire profit from use of the
invention. That suggests that the Nash bargaining solution would be a
fifty-fifty split of the infringer’s profits. If the patentee also practices
the patent, then licensing may involve some lost product sales, and this
would tend to raise the market-based equilibrium royalty. In any event,
the Federal Circuit has also rejected this approach, at least for the time
being.56 The result is that patent damages are most frequently
52

See 2A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, BLAIR & DURRANCE, supra note __, at
¶¶392, 395b, 397f.
53
15 U.S.C. §26.
54
35 U.S.C. §284.
55
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
56
E.g., Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(patent damages; evidence based on Nash bargaining model inadmissible).
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computed by using a yardstick methodology along with a hodgepot of
factors under the so-called Georgia-Pacific test that attempts mainly
to identify arms’ length bargains over similar patents and similar acts
of infringement.57
Categorical rejection of such methodologies seems wrongheaded. To be sure, the bargaining theory is complex and rests on
many assumptions. But the hodgepot of factors that constitute the
Georgia-Pacific test is certainly no better, and the 25% rule is nothing
but an unsupported generalization.
In any event, the problem of predicting merger harm is
fundamentally much easier because it does not require quantification
in the sense that the measurement of damages does, but only a showing
that the effect of the merger may be to increase prices.
Nash Bargaining and Merger Efficiencies
Assessing consumer harm a vertical merger can become more
difficult if the merger produces significant and merger-specific
efficiencies. Here the Merger Guidelines state that a prima facie
unlawful merger can be saved by merger specific efficiencies that will
be passed on to consumers sufficiently that the post-merger price will
be no higher than the pre-merger price.58 The term “merger specific”
means that the efficiency cannot readily be attained by means other
See also Vaporstream, Inc. v. Snap, Inc., 2020 WL 2543814 (C.D.Cal. Jan.
10, 2020) (rejecting expert testimony on damages using Nash bargaining
model); Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 798 F.Supp.2d 1111, 11191121 (N.D.Cal. 2011) (copyright; refusing to admit expert testimony on
damages using Nash bargaining model); Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft corp.,
2014 WL 350062 (D.Del. 2014). Cf. AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782
F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (not explicitly referencing Nash bargaining
model, but approving expert’s testimony of 50-50 split when it was within
the historical range of actual royalties). See William Choi & Roy Weinstein,
An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty Rate Calculations, 41 IDEA 49,
56-60 (2001).
57
Georgia-Pacific corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Yl
1970); see Utex Indus., Inc. v. Wiegand, 2020 WL 873985 (S. D. Tex. Feb.
21, 2020) (dicta approving yardstick method for patent damages). For a
severe critique, see Erik Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent
Damages Skew Licensing Markets, 36 REV. LITIG. 379 (2018).
58
VMG, supra note __, §6.
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than the merger. In cases with offsetting efficiencies the predicted
price increase and the size of the efficiency offset would need to be
estimated sufficiently to show that the post-merger price is no higher
than the pre-merger price. While establishing this can be difficult, it
still does not require a determination of how much prices will go up,
but only that they will go up. Prediction becomes more difficult as
cases are closer.
The burden of proof for defenses should generally be on the
defendants. Defenses are all about engineering costs, economies of
scale, distribution, management, transaction costs, eliminated
coordination costs, IP portfolios, or make-vs-buy alternatives. For all
of these the defendant is in a better position to have information about
them and how they will be affected by the merger.59 Indeed, predicted
efficiencies provide the motives for any merger whose gain comes
from a source other than a price increase. Presumably a rational
acquiring firm has evaluated these possibilities before it made its
decision. The merging firms are also in the better position in most
cases to show that the claimed efficiencies are verifiable and merger
specific.
Bargaining Analysis of Vertical Mergers: Relative Robustness
The Nash bargaining evaluation of vertical mergers may
produce a certain amount of skepticism among judges, who might
regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as
excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.
However, we have been there before.
The introduction of
concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines
was initially met with skepticism. Gradually they were accepted as
judges became more comfortable with them.
In fact, the theory that relates a particular reading on a
concentration index to the risk of noncompetitive outcomes from
horizontal mergers involves at least as much conjecture as does the
bargaining theory that the Nash model contemplates.60 A few early
59

See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶970f (4th ed. 2016).
60
See 4 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶930-932
(4th ed. 2016).
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decisions showed strong skepticism about the HHI and either rejected
or seriously qualified its use.61
The HHI as used in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
expresses a generalization about diverse anticompetitive strategies,
including explicit or follow-the-leader collusion as well as
noncooperative Cournot pricing under a variety of behavioral
assumptions. The HHI itself is mathematically derived from a pure
Cournot theory62 and used even though most models of coordinated
interaction today deviate significantly from the original Cournot
assumptions.63 Sometimes the behavioral assumptions driving these
models are inconsistent. For example, a factor such as disparities in
firm size may serve to raise the Cournot equilibrium price, but at the
same time it may make it more difficult for a cartel to reach a stable
agreement. That is, sometimes the assumptions pull in opposite
directions.
What they generally share in common, however, is the view
that the competitive threat varies inversely with the number of firms in
a market and directly with the increase in concentration. Disparities in
firm size are perhaps a little less relevant but important nonetheless. If
the fear is a cooperative form of collusion the resulting price is
typically the same no matter how many participants, although the
likelihood of success and cartel stability is greater as the number of
participants is smaller. Likewise, in a cartel the price does not vary
systematically with firm size. By contrast, if the fear is noncooperative
Cournot-style oligopoly then the size of the price increase depends on
both the number of firms and size disparities.

61

E.g., United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 748-749
n.38 (D. Md. 1976) (rejecting HHI); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530
F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982) (HHI okay as alternative to CR4).
62
See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
63
On the relation of the HHI to pure Cournot assumptions see Daniel P.
O’Brien and Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership,
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 594-596
(2000). See also William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx
& Steven P. Schulenberg, Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 397 (2009); Janusz A. Ordover, Coordinated Effects in
Merger Analysis: An Introduction, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 411, 414.
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All of this, including the manifold variety of models, is well
established in the industrial organization literature on collusion and
oligopoly.64 The concentration thresholds in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines do no more than capture a rough generalization about the
link between higher prices, the number of firms in a market, their size
disparities, and the extent of the increase that results from the merger.
The judicial decisions today rarely revisit these issues in any
detail, and most willingly conclude that changes in concentration
indexes are predictive of merger outcomes. Of course, the value of an
economic model is not its descriptive realism but its testability.
Empirically, the links between concentration, concentration increases,
and post-merger price increases resulting from horizontal mergers
does fairly well, although which is more important can be debated.65
The use of concentration indexes in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines has one thing going for it that the vertical merger measures
do not, and that is the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. In the
Philadelphia Bank decision the Court wrote that a numerical
prediction of competitive consequences:
is sound only if it is based upon a firm understanding of the
structure of the relevant market; yet the relevant economic
data are both complex and elusive. * * * [U]nless
businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger
with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded.
* * * So also, we must be alert to the danger of subverting
congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic
investigation.
[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm [1]
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market,
64

E.g., Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, Ch. 6, in HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 329-414 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
Willig, eds., 1989). See generally 1 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY AND
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Luis C. Corchon and Marco A. Marini, eds.,
2018), esp. Chs. 2,3, 5, 6, 7.
65
See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2014). Cf. Volker Nocke &
Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers
(NBER, 2020), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w27533 (arguing
that the concentration increase is more important than the level).
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and [2] results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined [3] in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely to have such anticompetitive effects. * * *66
This numbered set of criteria claims widespread support. What
we want to know about a horizontal merger is something about the
post-merger market share and the amount by which the merger
increases market concentration.67 It is unclear that the Court in
Philadelphia Bank had any particular model of collusion or oligopoly
in mind. Indeed, it is not even clear that the Court was concerned about
high prices. It may just as possibly have been concerned about the
post-merger firm’s ability to undersell rivals.
Another attribute of concentration indexes is that they cannot
be applied until a market has been defined. Market definitions are
always problematic, particularly in differentiated markets such as are
common subjects of merger litigation. To the extent a market
definition includes differentiated products they are treated as perfect
competitors, which is wrong and understates the power that individual
firms can exert. To the extent they exclude differentiated products they
treat them as if they do not compete at all, which is also wrong and
exaggerates power.68 Indeed, these under- and over-inclusive
characteristics of market definition largely undermine its value in the
treatment of unilateral effects mergers.
The best case for use of the HHI or any concentration index is
an informed hunch that the threat of noncompetitive behavior gets
bigger as the number of effective players in a market diminishes.
Empirically, that hunch turns out to be fairly robust, although the HHI
itself gives an illusion of precision that is not justified by reality.69
66

United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-363 (1963)
(bracketed numbers added).
67
On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal
Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 Yale L.J. 1996
(2018).
68
See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437
(2010); 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶910e.
69
See John E. Kwoka, The Herfindahl Index in Theory and Practice, 30
ANTITRUST BULL. 915 (1985).
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Seen in this light, the emergence of unilateral effects theory
was a significant improvement in analysis.70 Dispensing with
traditional market definition, it focuses on substitution rates, or
elasticities, among competitive pairings of firms. Where the data are
available, measurement of these is almost certainly much better than
use of the HHI as a predictor of collusive interaction.
Stacked up against this history, the Nash bargaining theory that
suggests a presumptive fifty-fifty split of the surplus is defensible –
certainly sufficiently defensible to meet §7’s “may substantially lessen
competition” standard. Nevertheless, the theory places a burden on
both the agencies as well as consulting and academic economists to
test their analysis empirically and also produce simplifying
methodologies that make the analysis more accessible. That can only
improve over time. This places a premium on continuous empirical
investigation of merger outcomes, as we have done for horizontal
mergers.
Even in the presence of substantial merger specific
efficiencies, the precise location of the Nash bargaining outcome will
be crucial only in close cases. Given the very small number of times
efficiencies of this nature and magnitude have been found, this
problem should not arise frequently. The problem of elimination of
double marginalization, discussed below, presents some different
issues.71
Profit-Maximization and Bargaining Assumptions
Nash bargaining methodologies assume that business firms are
rational profit-maximizers. Such an assumption is essential to
economics generally, as well as to rational antitrust policy. For their
part, judges must accept and internalize the fact that rational actor
assumptions are the things that makes economic prediction possible.
To that end, it was a serious misstep in the AT&T/TW litigation for the
70

Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to
Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010); 4 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶914e; Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, Mergers
with Unilateral Effects: A Simpler and More Accurate Alternative to Market
Definition
(FTC,
Feb.
12,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/docs/shapiro.pdf.
71
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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district judge to acknowledge a defense argument that after the merger
the firm would not seek to maximize overall profits but would consider
the profits of each division separately.72 Accepting an assumption of
that nature would not only defeat vertical merger analysis, it would
make a wide range of economic policy making based on prediction
impossible.
Further, neither the courts nor the parties addressed the
implications of this defense argument on the other defense – namely,
that the merger would eliminate double marginalization, discussed
below. The defendant was effectively arguing that the post-merger
firm was not a profit-maximizer when TW computed its licensing
prices, but that it was a profit-maximizer for purposes of considering
double marginalization. The two positions are inconsistent. Double
marginalization occurs when firms do not coordinate their output and
prices, and the defense concerning TW’s pricing asserted that they
would not be coordinating after the merger either.
Market Structure and Product Differentiation
Competition is always about the existence and availability of
alternatives. They are what force a firm to keep its price down,
knowing that a customer will be able to buy from someone else. The
bargaining theory that guides vertical merger analysis depends heavily
on the availability of alternatives. A bargainer’s willingness to pay a
particular seller for any good is substantially a function of the amount
it would have to pay for a similar good from someone else. To take an
obvious example, if a grocery chain acquires an egg producer and the
egg market is competitive, the acquisition is unlikely to have much
effect on the chain’s ability to force higher egg costs on its rivals. They
have plenty of alternatives and all eggs are alike. If the post-merger
firm attempts to jack up the price of wholesale eggs they will go
elsewhere.
One of the more important examples given in the VMG is
unfortunate. The illustration involves oranges, an undifferentiated
commodity. The example that the VMG give is that by acquiring an
orange supplier an orange juice manufacturer is able to charge rivals a
72

United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 222-223 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd,
916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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higher price for oranges, or perhaps stop supplying to them
altogether.73
That illustration would be much more plausible if it involved a
more specialized manufactured product and a more concentrated
market with fewer alternatives. For example, it could be a
microprocessor chip or perhaps even the heavy duty truck wheels in
the Fruehauf case.74 Oranges for the United States market are grown
by thousands of domestic growers, situated mainly in California,
Florida, Texas, and Arizona. In addition are significant foreign
imports, mainly from Mexico, Chile, South Africa and Australia.75 To
be sure, transportation costs may limit some processing markets to
local areas, although the Example does not say that and the fact of
transportation from far off places such as Australia makes it unlikely.
The strategy outlined in the VMG’s orange example works
much better in a case such as AT&T/Time-Warner because TW’s
content is unique, significantly differentiated, and highly desirable.
Rival cable companies certainly need TW’s content much more than
any particular orange juice maker needs a particular supplier’s
oranges. What would be helpful is some more factually realistic
information about exactly how a vertical acquisition goes about
denying access to rivals or raising their costs. The Guidelines decline
to require a minimum market share, but they do state that they “may
rely on evidence of head-to-head competition between one merging
firm and rivals that trade with the other merging firm when evaluating
unilateral effects,” which includes the foreclosure and RRC theories.76
This formulation reflects a reality that has already been
developed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines analysis of
unilateral effects mergers. Even for firms that compete with one
another, the elasticity of substitution among various pairs of
competitors can vary.
In a differentiated market not every
competitor’s offering represents an equally good alternative. As a
73

VMG, §4.a, Example 2.
Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
75
See https://www.producenews.net/markets-and-trends/10662-citrusimport-demand-up-and-growing-in-the-unitedstates#:~:text=South%20Africa%2C%20Chile%2C%20Mexico%20and,U.
S.%20market%20essentially%20since%202003.
76
VMG, §2.
74
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result, the question of how costly it is to deny a specialized input to a
manufacturer is one of degree. After a vertical merger a firm that raises
its price for the related product above pre-merger levels will still lose
sales, just as the related product did prior to the merger. The question
is how many and how much will be recaptured at the other level. In
the case of oranges, the likely answer is zero. In more concentrated
and differentiated markets recapture is more likely.
For example, if post-merger AT&T/TW raise the rates on TW
content, companies that compete with AT&T will reduce their
purchases, but by not purchasing they will lose customers who desire
TW content to DirecTV or one of AT&T’s regional cable companies.77
Or in Fruehauf, if the post-merger firm raises the price of wheels to
Fruehauf’s competitors, those competitors will face higher costs. On
the one hand they will purchase fewer wheels. On the other, truck
trailer customers will respond by purchasing more trailers from
Fruehauf.78 The tradeoff is what determines profitability, and the
equilibrium price after the merger could be higher.
What Happened to Intellectual Property?
One lamentable omission in the Guidelines is discussion of
intellectual property rights and the role that they might play in vertical
mergers. There is no sustained treatment of patents and no mention at
all of licensing.
IP rights have many distinct features that can affect vertical
merger analysis. One is the fact that IP rights are nonrivalrous, which
means that when they can permit unlimited copying. To illustrate, one
of the foreclosure complaints in the FTC’s unsuccessful Fruehauf case
was that the wheels and brakes acquired by a truck manufacturer had
experienced supply shortages.79 The court noted that these items had
“been subject to periodic shortages in the past,”80 and the merger
increased the likelihood that the post-merger firm would favor its own
parent rather than outside purchasers. Whatever one thinks of that as
a rationale for estimating foreclosure from a vertical merger, it has no
77

United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 222-223 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd,
916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
78
Fruehauf corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
79
Ibid.
80
Id. at 349.
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application to an IP right such as licenses to the digital video content
at issue in Time-Warner. The post-merger firm could consume
internally an indefinite number of copies of the Harry Potter movies
and still have an unlimited number of copies left over for outside
buyers if it chose to license them.
Pulling the other way, another fact about IP rights is that they
can promote product differentiation and, in the absence of a license,
limit copying. This tends to narrow or make more costly the available
alternatives. By acquiring a portfolio of valuable patents or other IP
rights a post-merger manufacturer may be able to raise its licensing
fees to rival manufacturers. If these competing manufacturers cannot
find adequate substitutes they will have to raise the prices of their
output, and some customers will substitute back to the post-merger
firm’s manufactured output. The AT&T/TW case presented precisely
this story in the context of copyrighted video content. Without a
license to Harry Potter, a rival firm can certainly make its own movie,
but making it is far more costly than licensing an existing copy and
success by no means assured.
One of the areas in which vertical mergers present the most
significant competitive threats are those that involve significant IP
licensing, both of patents and copyrighted media. Further, the fact that
these rights are both nonrivalrous and have very low marginal costs is
likely to have a significant impact on the range over which the parties
will bargain. The unintegrated holder of an IP portfolio has very low
variable costs, no constraint on production, and thus an incentive to
license to everyone, particularly if price discrimination is readily
available. By contrast, the vertically integrated holder of IP rights
must balance revenue gains from licensing against revenue losses from
the vertically related product.
Efficiencies and Double Marginalization
Introduction
Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers that threaten
to lessen competition but says nothing about offsetting efficiencies.
Indeed, it is not clear that an efficiencies defense is necessary or even
wise. An evaluation of net impact on competition should already take
efficiencies into account. This is clear in unilateral effects cases,
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where the models simultaneously account for upward pricing pressure
and offsetting cost reductions to predict a post-merger price.
The idea of an efficiencies “defense” with an offsetting burden
of proof really grew out of the welfare tradeoff model that Williamson
developed in the 1960s, which offset consumer harm resulting from an
output reduction against productive efficiency gains.81 Current merger
analysis does not view the relationship that way. Basically the
proponents of a merger must show that there will be no consumer harm
at all. As a result, all of the effects of the merger would be rolled into
a prediction of the post-merger price.
Most of the traditional discussion of vertical merger
efficiencies was about integration. To the extent that a merger
facilitates the physical integration of production, costs can decline.
This fact was not always offered as a defense and in the 1960s even
became a rationale for condemning some mergers. One example is
Allis-Chalmers, a vertical merger case that condemned the merger of
a manufacturer of rolling mills in the steel industry and the electrical
wiring harnesses used to transmit power to such mills.82 The court not
only recognized the efficiency but actually condemned the merger for
that reason. The court concluded that the merger would raise entry
barriers into the production of rolling mills, because it would create
“the only company capable of designing, producing and installing a
complete metal rolling mill.”83

81

See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
82
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus. 414 F.2d 506, 515-518
(3d Cir. 1969).
83
Cf. the “portfolio effects” or “range effects” theory that has had some use
in the EU but not the U.S., to condemn a vertical or conglomerate merger if
the ability of the post-merger firm to develop or sell the two products
together threatened to drive unintegrated rivals out of business. The EU
relied on the theory in 2005 to block the merger of General Electric Co. and
Honeywell, Inc., See Case No. COMP/M 2220, General
Electric/Honeywell, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
See Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition
Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (2002); William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate
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Production cost savings have always played a significant role
in vertical merger decisions and should be treated as qualifying
efficiencies. One warning here is that a merger in and of itself does
not create a single plant integrating the two levels, but only a single
firm owning two plants. As a result, production shifts and perhaps
even new plant construction or outfitting will be necessary. This is far
less likely to occur in a case such as AT&T/Time-Warner, where
production of cable or satellite access will happen on one set of
platforms and production of the digital content on another. The
savings are unlikely to occur in production costs.
The Government’s Vertical Merger Guidelines say very little
about specific efficiency effects from vertical mergers, except to
rename them “procompetitive effects” and combine the analysis with
the elimination of double marginalization (EDM).84 Nor do the
Guidelines discuss burdens of proof. As noted previously, however,
the burden of proving efficiencies should sensibly rest on the
defendant, who almost always has better control over the relevant
evidence.85
Transaction Cost Savings
In addition to production costs savings, which refer mainly to
engineering and physical integration costs, transaction cost savings
figure prominently in the analysis of vertical mergers. The costs of
reaching and enforcing a bargain may be high in some cases, and
vertical ownership can eliminate these. If a firm can produce a widget
internally at the same cost as that of an outside seller, then any
significant cost of using the market gives the advantage to internal
production.
The origin of many of our ideas about transaction cost savings
is Ronald Coase’s 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm. Coase argued
that firm boundaries are explained by transaction costs, which he
termed “marketing costs.”86 He compared the costs of purchasing an
Mergers and Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10
GMU L. REV. 533 (2002).
84
VMG, supra note __, §6.
85
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
86
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 392
(1937) (“… the operation of a market costs something and by forming an
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input against the costs of internal production. The firm will choose the
method that results in the best payoff, given that transacting is costly.
The aggregation of these choices determines the boundaries of the
firm.
In making this calculation, merger would seem to be a relevant
alternative that should have been on the table. However, Coase never
discussed them. For any input alpha, Coase assumed that the firm
would either purchase it or make it for itself. He did not mention the
possibility that the firm might acquire an alpha-producing firm.
Nevertheless, transaction costs savings are relevant to merger analysis
when the costs of purchasing and operating a firm are less than the cost
of either new entry or purchasing the finished input on a market. The
hypothetical firm in Coase’s model actually has three choices rather
than two: procurement of alpha on the market, entry into selfproduction, or purchase of an alpha manufacturer. It chooses
whichever of the three promises the best payoff.
EDM in Vertical Relationships
The double marginalization problem is best understood as part
of the transaction cost problem. It arises when a bargaining
impediment to coordination limits the ability of two firms with market
power to reach the joint maximizing position. Each firm maximizes
without taking into account that the other firm also has market power.
As a result, each one takes an excessive monopoly markup, output is
too low and price too high to be maximizing for either party.87
Double marginalization is nothing more than a cost of
transacting, and it can be controlled either by merger or by contractual
coordination. If two parties can eliminate a particular transaction cost
they can both profit. This might occur, for example, if a buyer and
seller agree to eliminate the services of a broker and deal with each
other directly. This method of transaction cost reduction occurs

organisation and allowing some authority (an " entrepreneur ") to direct the
resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”).
87
For development, see HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra
note __, §9.2.
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frequently enough that it was separately addressed by the RobinsonPatman Act.88
As a result, the VMG are incorrect to state that the elimination
of double marginalization is not a “procurement efficiency,” but
simply a failure of alignment of the economic incentives between the
merging firms.89 Any transaction cost savings could be assigned or
divided by the parties through a suitably renegotiated contract.
As noted above, in The Nature of the Firm Coase discussed
outside procurement and internal production as alternative ways of
obtaining an input. He did not discuss mergers. There is a good reason
for his omission: he himself did not believe it. He did speak about
mergers as an alternative to contracting in his later writing on the
vertical merger between General Motors and one of its major input
suppliers, Fisher Body Works. Coase strongly dissented from the view
that complexities in contracting explained that merger. By using sidepayments, two-part contracting or other more complex contracting
relationship the firms should have been able to achieve joint
maximizing results.
The standard theory that asset specificity, sunk costs, or other
precommitments can cause negotiation breakdown and lead to vertical
mergers was developed in a well-known paper by Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian (KCA).90 They argued that holdup problems upset a long
standing bilateral bargaining relationship between Fisher Body and
GM, which GM was able to resolve only by acquiring Fisher. Fisher
Body’s nearby geographic location to GM gave it unique advantages
as GM’s supplier, and vice-versa, locking the two firms together to the
extent that contracting with others was more costly. The fact that auto
bodies had to be individually designed in a specialized plant and
guaranteed in sufficient numbers in advance created significant
88

See 15 U.S.C. §13c (making it unlawful to give a price discount in lieu of
brokerage unless the buyer actually performed the brokerage services in
question). See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960); and 13
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2362 (4th ed. 2019).
89
VMG, supra note __, §6.
90
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
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opportunities for holdup. Each party effectively became a hostage to
the other. The result was bargaining breakdowns, or instances in
which one party did not behave in ways that the other party anticipated.
Contracting finally broke down when GM wanted to open a new plant
in Flint, some sixty miles away, and wanted Fisher to build a plant
there as well. This resulted from GM’s preference that all elements of
production be located close together. Fisher, however, preferred to
expand output from its existing plant in Detroit.
The KCA view was that this dispute was an impasse that
resulted in GM’s acquisition. Coase’s view was that it was soluble by
contract. In fact, the parties actually had been able to bargain to the
joint maximizing position.91 Thereupon a lively and largely unresolved
debate ensued over what really happened in the Fisher Body case, and
the extent to which contracting could work as easily as merger to solve
the problem.92
The debate over vertical integration and holdup merged themes
that Coase had developed in his two best-known articles, The Nature
of the Firm93 and The Problem of Social Cost.94 The first argued that
the boundaries of a firm are determined by the firm’s continuous
search to procure inputs in the most cost effective way. The second
argued that two traders in a well-functioning market will be able to
achieve the joint-maximizing solution. That relationship is too often
91

Ronald H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43
J. L. & ECON. 15 (2000); Ronald H. Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The
Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. MAN. 255
(2006).
92
See Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm,
43 J. L. & ECON. 105 (2000); Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel
Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J. L. & ECON. 67 (2000); Robert F.
Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body
Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000). See also Douglas G. Baird, In
Coase’s Footsteps, 70 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 23 (2003); Yoshiro Miwa & J.
Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments:
Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2636 (2000); Susan Helper, John Paul MacDuffie, and Charles Sabel,
Pragmatic collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling
Opportunism, 9 INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 443 (2000).
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Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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ignored. For example, Ben Klein’s article responding to the Coase
critique of the Fisher Body merger relied heavily on Coase’s Nature of
the Firm, as it should have, but it never cited The Problem of Social
Cost.95
Viewed in this perspective, there is more than a little cognitive
dissonance in the debate over EDM. Anti-interventionist conservatives
and libertarians rely heavily on Coasean arguments that unless high
transaction costs get in the way firms will be able to bargain to joint
maximizing results. By contrast, regulation creates inalienability rules
that undermine these results.96 If that is true, however, then double
marginalization will rarely provide a defense to a vertical merger. The
law of vertical mergers deals largely with firms that transact with one
another routinely, in legally enforceable buy-sell relationships. Yet for
some reason they are unable to arrive at joint maximizing agreements.
One interesting thing about The Problem of Social Cost is that
most of the actors that appear in it do not bargain with each other
regularly and there are not well established markets for them to do so.
In fact, many of the markets are bilateral monopolies. They are
certainly in a position to sue one another, and do, but the transaction
costs of litigating are extremely high in comparison with the give and
take of more conventional markets. The potential bargainers who
populate Social Cost are pairs like the doctor and confectioner who
share a party wall,97 the homeowner and the nearby airport,98 the cattle
rancher and neighboring farmer,99 the spark-emitting chimney and
downwind neighbor,100 or the hotel whose addition blocks light to
sunbathers at an adjacent hotel.101 In all of these cases the parties
actually go to court rather than solve the problem by bargaining. The
principal relationship among all of these is that they are physical
neighbors, not that they engage in regular buyer-seller contracting. If
95

Klein, Fisher-General Motors, supra note __.
For a good statement of the positions, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note __.
97
Id. at 2-3, discussing Sturges v. Bridgeman, (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852.
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Id. at 25, discussing Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d
245 (1942).
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Coase, Social Cost, passim.
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anything, contractual solutions to the double marginalization problem
should be far easier to come by.
The economics of double marginalization was developed in the
1950s in a context that tended to view firms as fixed entities unto
themselves.102 If a firm is simply a nexus of contracts, however, and
anything that can be accomplished within a firm can also be
accomplished by a suitably designed contract, then double
marginalization should not exist. Two firms contracting with one
another should be able to solve the problem just as much as two
different departments or divisions within a single firm.
As noted previously, by crediting the defense in the
AT&T/Time-Warner case that post-merger TW would go right on
maximizing its profits individually, without regard for AT&T, it was
also implicitly rejecting the argument that the merger would eliminate
double marginalization. The defendant’s were saying, in effect, that
coordination of output would not even occur after the merger. If that
were true, then post-merger EDM should not be assumed.
Complements vs. Vertical Relationships
A vertical merger typically involves firms who are already in a
bargaining relationship or are well positioned to be in one. As Cournot
originally developed what came to be known as the theory of “Cournot
complements,” or double marginalization, it involved firms who
produced monopolized complementary inputs sold to a common
buyer.103 A well known example is royalty stacking vis-à-vis a licensee
that needs several patents in order to produce a product.104 Firms that
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E.g., Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J.
POL. ECON. 347 (1950). See also Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral
Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA
101 (1960) (discussing scholarship to that time).
103
AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99-116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans.,
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1838).
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TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent
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sell complementary inputs do not ordinarily deal with one another, and
as a result coordination is more difficult to achieve.
For example, suppose a device such as a toaster requires
licenses from A, B, C & D, each of which owns a patent covering a
distinct but essential component. The theory of Cournot complements
states that each will set a royalty that maximizes its returns individually
and the sum of the resulting royalties will be too high. The patentees
could earn more by coordinating their license fees, and the output gains
would more than offset the lower royalty rates that they receive. The
toaster manufacturer would profit because the input costs for making
toasters would go down. Consumer would benefit because the price
of toasters would decline as well. However, if the complementary
sellers of inputs to a common licensee agreed to coordinate license fees
with one another they would very likely be guilty of collusion.105 One
alternative that might eliminate double marginalization while avoiding
antitrust liability would be pooling, in which the four patentees
aggregated their patents by cross-licensing and a single entity licensed
them out to the toaster maker.
By contrast to sellers of complements, vertically related firms
deal with each other regularly. Two firms who bargain with one
another regularly should be able to reach the joint maximizing result,
and double marginalization is not joint maximizing. To the extent they
can coordinate price and output they both will be better off. Merging
is of course a way of coordinating price and output, but Coase’s point
was that the firms should be able to reach that result without having to
merge.
The thing that can defeat this result is high transaction costs,
but in a case that involves durable vertical relationships transaction
costs should induce the firms to reach a deal more quickly. In addition,
another bargaining impediment to EDM was harsh rules against
vertical restraints such as minimum and maximum resale price
maintenance. But those constraints have very largely been removed
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by the Supreme Court.106 EDM may also require price discrimination
favoring some buyers, but such discrimination rarely raises antitrust
issues.
Contractual EDM is usually superior to a vertical merger
because it permits the parties to focus on individual inputs. After all,
the double marginalization problem usually concerns specific products
or assets, not necessarily entire firms. For example, the gasoline
refiner with market power who sells gasoline to a local retailer with
market power faces a double marginalization problem with respect to
gasoline. For the rest of the local retailer’s business the refiner is
presumably indifferent. Even traditional gasoline stations sell tires,
batteries, and auto repair services. Gasoline sellers who operate
through convenience stores sell a great deal more. The contractual
solution permits the parties to bargain over the one input, gasoline,
over which the two are failing to maximize. By contrast, the merger
focuses the refiner to go into the retailing business.
It is thus quite appropriate for the Agencies evaluating vertical
mergers to presume that EDM is not a “merger specific” defense. In
most cases contractual alternatives should be both superior and
available. Significantly, this becomes relevant only after a prima facie
case against the merger has been made. Without explicitly assigning
the burden of proof, the Agencies are thus correct to require the
merging firms “to provide substantiation for claims that they will
benefit” from EDM.107 The Guidelines add:
In assessing the merger-specificity of the elimination of
double marginalization, the Agencies typically examine
whether it would likely be less costly for the merged firm to
self-supply inputs following the merger than for the
downstream firm to purchase them from one or more
independent firms absent the merger. The merging parties’
evidence about existing contracting practices is often the best
106

See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877 (2007) (overruling per se rule against resale price maintenance); State
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resale price maintenance).
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evidence of the price the downstream firm would likely pay for
inputs absent the merger. The Agencies also consider other
evidence, such as contracts between similarly situated firms in
the same industry and contracting efforts considered by the
merging firms.108
The Guidelines then go on, however, to say that they will not
require bargaining solutions that might “theoretically be achieved” but
that are “not reflected in documentary evidence.”109 That position is
needlessly conservative.
Conclusion
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines are not perfect, but they
are a significant step in the right direction. Now, as in the case of
horizontal mergers, the track record of vertical mergers must be
evaluated, focusing mainly on the more marginal cases in which a
merger was approved. The courts for their part would do best to give
the Agencies the benefit of the doubt, using third-party courtappointed experts in difficult cases.
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